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Abstract. Web-Based Social Networks (WBSNs) are used by millions of
people worldwide. While WBSNs provide many benets, privacy preser-
vation is a concern. The management of access control can help to assure
data is accessed by authorized users. However, it is critical to provide
sucient exibility so that a rich set of conditions may be imposed by
users. In this paper we coin the term user provenance to refer to trac-
ing users actions to supplement the authorisation decision when users
request access. For example restricting access to a particular photo-
graph to those which have \liked" the owners prole. However, such
a tracing of actions has the potential to impact the privacy of users re-
questing access. To mitigate this potential privacy loss the concept of
translucency is applied. This paper extends SoNeUCONABC model and
presents SoNeUCONABCPro, an access control model which includes
translucent user provenance. Entities and access control policies along
with their enforcement procedure are formally dened. The evaluation
demonstrates that the system satises the imposed goals and supports
the feasibility of this model in dierent scenarios.
Key words: Social networks, Access Control, User provenance, Translu-
cency
1 Introduction
The continuing proliferation of Web-Based Social Networks (WBSNs) encour-
ages their study and research. This escalation raises questions about security and
privacy due to the amount of managed personal data being shared. For instance,
each minute around 2.5 million items are shared on Facebook and 200,000 pho-
tos are uploaded to Instagram1. Facebook has increased the amount of privacy
controls, enabling users to restrict the content that is viewable by others. Thus,
1 http://aci.info/2014/07/12/the-data-explosion-in-2014-minute-by-minute-
infographic/
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when a user writes a message or adds a friend, privacy controls associated with
that content will dictate what is viewable by his friends2.
Access control has been a challenging matter [5, 7]. It is considered such an
important thing that [27] considers that the management of who accesses data
should be a requirement whatever the cost. An important aspect is to provide
an access control mechanism that is both exible and ne-grained. There has
been previous work on data provenance, dened as the process of tracing and
recording the origin of data and any subsequent change [3][24]. Based on this
concept, we coin the term user provenance to refer to the process of tracing users'
actions, and using that information as a basis for decisions related to granting
access. User provenance would make it possible to include additional constrains
on users requesting access based on, for instance, where the user comes from or
the actions that the user has previously performed.
There are several dierent user actions in WBSNs, i.e. the addition of com-
ments, the uploading of photos, etc. User provenance could oer interesting
access control management alternatives in this respect. The following set of
paradigmatic scenarios motivates the development of an access control model
that addresses user provenance.
{ Customer acquisition. Parker's, a well-known restaurant, wants to imple-
ment an aggresive marketing campaign to steal clients of competitors. Thus,
access to a special promotion is granted only to customers that have visited
the Facebook prole of competing restaurants at least once in the last week.
{ Loyalty program. Christian loves keeping up with the latest fashions as well
as receiving feedback about his new clothes. He usually uploads photos of his
new clothes to Facebook and users who make comments on them are allowed
to access additional fashion photos he has posted. In this way, Christian limits
the number of photos non-interested users can access while allowing interested
ones to view a more extensive range of images.
{ Focused access. Julia went to a Bon Jovi's concert and uploaded photos
of the event to Facebook. To prevent Bon Jovi's detractors to post negative
comments or create mocking memes based on these photos, she decided to
grant access only to actual fans { users who have liked Bon Jovi's contents at
least ve times in the month.
According to these scenarios, the potential for privacy loss cannot be disre-
garded in the context of user provenance. Tracing user actions means that they
are potentially transparent to the other users as these actions become part of the
access control process. While tailored access control is desirable, transparency
can directly aect privacy. An analogy can be drawn concerning glass-walled
houses in which the clear glass walls makes it easy for anybody to look in-
side them. A potential method of limiting this aect is applying the concept
of translucency, introduced by Mike Leiter [19], which can be used to balance
transparency and privacy [29]. Using a smoked glass-walled home will still al-
low an onlooker to look inside but reducing the amount of details that can be
2 http://www.jonloomer.com/2012/05/06/history-of-facebook-changes/
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ascertained. Analogously, integrating a translucency mechanism as part of the
user provenance access control management is desirable. In this way, users con-
trol actions applied in the access control process and actions that should remain
private.
To the best of our knowledge, no single access control model for WBSNs
has been proposed enabling the expressiveness permitted by user provenance.
SoNeUCONABC [15] already considers the needs of exibility, ne-granularity,
attribute management and usage control, which are desirable access control prop-
erties. In this paper, an extension called SoNeUCONABCPro is proposed to
address translucent user provenance. The behaviour of users is considered in
the access control enforcement process through the management of performed
actions but also considering the users right to keep some actions hidden.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey introduces SoNeUCONABC .
The proposed model is presented in Section 3. The denition and enforcement
of access control policies are described in Section 4, with Section 5 providing an
evaluation. An overview of other related work is described in Section 6. Finally,
in Section 7 conclusions and future work are outlined.
2 Background
In this Section SoNeUCONABC access control model [15] is introduced. SoNeUCONABC
is an expressive usage control model that manages six WBSN features, namely,
common-contacts, clique, distance, multi-path, direction and exible attributes
[13][8][5][4].
SoNeUCONABC is composed of seven elements: Subjects (S) together with
Subject attributes (ATT (S)) refer to WBSN users and their attributes; Objects
(O) together with Object attributes (ATT (O)) correspond to WBSN data and
their attribute; and Relationships (RT ) together with Relationship attributes
(ATT (RT )) refer to the set of relations and attributes that exist between a pair
of users, with direct relationships denoted as E and ATT (E) their attached
attributes; Rights (R) correspond to actions that can be performed over objects
O; Authorizations (A) are rules to be satised to grant a subject a right on an
object; Obligations (B) correspond to requirements to be met before or during
the usage process; and Conditions (C) are requirements needed regarding the
context features, eg. network availability.
In SoNeUCONABC , access control policies () consist of subjects, objects,
relationships predicates (s, o and rt respectively), a right (r) is also provided
as well as any obligations (@b) and conditions (@c) to be satised. An access
control policy  is expressed as (s; o; rt; r; @b; @c).
An example of an access control policy is presented: Access is granted to
photos entitled \Party" to friends of a friend if they are under 30 years old or
if they are under 25 years and have studied computer science.
 = (((age < 30) _ ((age < 25) ^ (studies = c:science))); (title =
party); ((((role = friend); (role = friend))); ;; ;); read; ;; ;)
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Note that symbol ; is applied for policy elements which do not need to
be involved in the access control management process. The rst ; means that
multiple paths are not managed, the second one that cliques between users are
not considered and the nal pair of ; means that conditions and obligations
respectively are not included in this policy. See [15] for details.
3 SoNeUCONABCPro proposal
This section outlines the main features of SoNeUCONABCPro. For the ease of
reading Table 1 presents main used notation.
Table 1. Notation table
 Access control policy
t Translucency policy
si A subject i
oi An object i
rti A relationship i
r Right to be granted
@c Conditions
 Obligations
 User provenance pred.
@o Obligation dierent from 
Pacui Path, actions carried out by user ui
ui user i
acj ui:ok Action j performed by ui over ok
ei edge/ relationship i
3.1 Goals
SoNeUCONABCPro should include the management of user provenance, fa-
cilitating access control management that is based on the actions performed
by WBSN users (called requesters) over other users' data. The system must
allow the denition of access control policies that consider previous actions of
requesters. The system must also enable translucency, allowing requesters to
hide some, or all of their, actions when an access control policy is evaluated.
3.2 Supporting example
This example presents actions carried out by Daniel when he interacts in a
WBSN with Alice, Bob and Charly. According to what is described here, access
control has to be managed considering interactions performed by Daniel. More-
over, all restrictions, either performed by Daniel or by other user, as it is the
case of Bob, have to be excluded in the access control process to respect users'
privacy.
In a WBSN Daniel interacts with his direct friends Alice, Bob and Charly.
Fig. 1 depicts the interactions that Daniel made between the 1st and 5th of
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June. On the 1st June Daniel added a like to photo1, photo2 and to the prole of
Charly. In addition Daniel posted a comment on Alice's wall. Over the four days
of activity covered by Fig. 1, Daniel performed a total of 11 actions on various
elements of the proles of his contacts. Moreover, Daniel wants to hide that he
has clicked \like" in any of his friends' proles, Alice's and Charly's proles in
this scenario.
Additionally, Bob species that access to photos entitled \SummerWithAlice"
would be only granted to WBSN users who like Alice's prole.
Fig. 1. Actions of Daniel over his contacts' data
3.3 Model denition
Expressing user provenance in terms of SoNeUCONABC could be modelled as
some Rights ri that are given after fullling some Obligations bi. Let us consider
the supporting example, the Right of accessing photos entitled \SummerWith-
Alice" is given to users that have liked Alice's prole (Obligation). However,
Obligations in SoNeUCONABC cannot be related to specic objects or sub-
jects. The proposed case needs to express that the obligation is to access the
prole (object) of Alice (subject). This lack of expressiveness motivates the ex-
tension presented herein.
User provenance management requires including performed actions within
the access control process. WBSN actions, dened as Actions AC, are mod-
elled as a particular type of Obligation bi. Thus, SoNeUCONABCPro extends
SoNeUCONABC including entity Actions AC within Obligations B together
with attached links (Fig. 2). AC are performed by subjects S over objects O
and then, AC is related to S and O. Consequently, including AC in B comprises
new links whose management needs to be specied.
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Fig. 2. SoNeUCONABCPro
3.4 Translucent user provenance
Actions management involves the creation of a path per user ui (Pacui ) where
nodes are WBSN actions (acj ui:ok) performed over objects ok that include the
date and time when they are performed; and edges are time relationships (eti)
among nodes. The construction of Pacui comprises two steps:
1. Identication of all users U 0 that have resources over which the requester, a
user ui, has performed an action.
2. Ordering of actions based on date and time. Note that sequential actions over
the same object are represented as dierent nodes connected in temporal
order.
Concerning the supporting example a path is constructed based on the date
and time of actions performed by Daniel. Fig. 3 depicts the formal representation
(Pacu4 ), being Daniel u4 and Alice, Bob and Charly u1, u2 and u3 respectively.
When Daniel, u4, requests a permission over an object of other user, access
control involves verifying some actions of the created path to grant or deny
the requested permission accordingly. If Daniel would not mind to disclose any
action and if he requests access to \SummerWithAlice" photos, the created path
is evaluated and the access granted because he clicked \like" on Alice's, u1, prole
on June 3rd (ac6 u1:o6).
SoNeUCONABCPro also manages translucency. Given the inclusion of AC
within B, translucency is based on managing which aci performed by the re-
quester ui over an oi of a user uj should remain accessible. In other words,
access to chosen nodes acj ui:ok is denied such that acj ui:ok and attached eti
are deleted from Pacui in the access control enforcement process. Recalling the
supporting example, as Daniel, u4, does not want to disclose that he has liked Al-
ice's, u1, and Charly's, u3, proles, actions ac4 u3:o4 and ac6 u1:o6 (highlighted
in Fig. 3) are not involved in the process. Then, \SummerWithAlice" pictures
6
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Fig. 3. Pacu4 formal representation of supporting example (Fig. 1)
are denied to Daniel, u4. More specically, ac3 u3:o3 would be linked to ac5 u1:o5
through et3 and ac5 u1:o5 would be linked to ac7 u2:o7 through et5.
4 Access control policies
This Section includes the description and enforcement of access control policies.
4.1 Description
Access control policies are enhanced to address user provenance and translu-
cency. While the former requires the update of SoNeUCONABC policies,
translucency management requires the inclusion of a new set of policies called
translucency policies (t).
Concerning user provenance, the same operators and attributes as those ap-
plied in SoNeUCONABC [15] are considered. Nonetheless, access control poli-
cies are dened in terms of ATT (S), ATT (O), ATT (RT ), R, C, B and AC. In
particular, an access control policy is formally dened as (s; o; rt; r;; @c).
Recalling Section 2, the only dierence is that  replaces @b. In fact,  is a
superset containing SoNeUCONABC obligations as well as the user provenance
actions () introduced in SoNeUCONABCPro.  is described as follows using
BNF notation [28]:
{  ::= (;jj@b) ::= (;j(acti; dt; 0w)j@b) ::= (;j(acti; dt; 0s; 0o; 0rt)j@b)
{  comprises predicates applied for user provenance management.
{ @b refers to any type of obligation dierent from those related to user prove-
nance, e.g. the need to have 10 contacts at least. This type of obligation is
analogous to the ones presented in SoNeUCONABC .
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{ acti refers to all possible actions that can be applied in the WBSN context.
For instance, Liked, Visited, Commented, etc. Note that xAPI can be used
to represent user actions [1].
{ dt refers to the date (d) in the form YYYY/MM/DD and the time (t) in
the form HH:MM:SS when acti is performed. Data and time follow ISO
8601 [30]. Any element, e.g. DD, can take symbol  meaning that no re-
strictions are established. dt can take symbol ; meaning that no element
has restrictions.
{ 0w refer to subjects, objects and relationship predicates, where w can take
three possible values { s, o or e {, to indicate its relation to subjects, objects
or relationships. Specically, 0s refers to subjects with a relationship type
0rt with the owner of the requested object who perform ri over objects
linked to 0o.
Example. Recalling the supporting example, the following user provenance
policy expresses that access to \SummerWithAlice" photos is only granted to
users who like Alice's, u1, prole,  (Liked; =  =    :  : ; (name =
Alice); (title = profile); ((((;))); ;; ;)).
On the other hand, t are proposed to limit which actions are applied in
the access control process and which ones remain hidden. All WBSN actions
are accessible to all users by default { the whole pacui is applied in managing
access control. However, if t exist, they are rstly evaluated against Pacui .
Actions acj ui:ok which satisfy established t are removed from the graph. t
are formally described as follows again applying BNF notation [28].
{ t ::= (acti; dt; 
00
w) ::= (acti; dt; 
00
s ; 
00
o ; 
00
rt)
{ acti refers to WBSN actions performed over objects linked to 
00
o .
{ dt refers to the date and time when acti is performed. Its structure is anal-
ogous to the one presented in .
{ 00w again involves subject, object and relationship predicates (
00
s , 
00
o and
00rt respectively) but meaning that removed nodes are those where objects
are linked to 00o whose owner satises 
00
s and has a relationship 
00
rt with the
data requester.
Example. Considering Fig. 3 and the supporting example, Daniel, u4, does
not want to disclose that he has liked his direct friends' proles. Thus, he es-
tablishes t1(Like; ;; (title = profile); ((((role = friend))); ;; 1)), such that
the resulting Pacu4 would be the one depicted in Fig. 3 removing nodes within
rectangles. In this way, Daniel, u4 limits which actions are accessible becoming
translucent.
4.2 Policy enforcement
Pacui is dened as an ordered list ( lpathui ) where each position is an ac-
tion acj ui:ok together with attached object ok. lpathui is formally represented
as lpathuifot; ack ui:ot ; ot+1; ac(k+1) ui:ok+1 ; :::g. For instance, based on Fig. 3,
lpathu4 fo1; ac1 u3:o1 ; o2; ac2 u1:o2 ; o3; ac3 u3:o3 ; o4; ac4 u3:o4 ; :::::; o11; ac11 u2:o11g.
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After the construction of Pacui per access request (s; o; r) (where s is the
requester, o the requested object and r the requested right over o), all access
control policies  and translucency policies t are evaluated. t are rstly evalu-
ated against lpath. Function evaluateTransPolicies is executed with the inputs
of t, lpath and req, where req is a reference to data pertaining to the requester,
such as his objects and relationships. If the result of the evaluation is `true' the
appropriate elements of lpath are removed and thus, newlpath is created and
applied in the evaluation of . Pseudo-code of evaluateTransPolicies is depicted
in Algorithm 1 where functions Match, MatchRT, GetSubAtt, GetObjAtt, Cre-
ateRT and GetAdmin are developed in SoNeUCONABC (see [15] for details).
These functions are used to verify that objects O, subjects S and relationships
RT predicates 00w involved in t match O, S and RT involved in lpaths. Note
that symbol \." is used to access the content of an element and the expression
list[pos] refers to accessing the element of list located at position pos.
Algorithm 1 evaluateTransPolicies
1: procedure evaluateTransPolicies(t; lpath; req )
2: for lpathui  (i = 1) to sizeOf(lpath) do
3: if t:acti = lpathui [j] then
4: if verifyDateT ime(t:dt; lpathui [j]) then
5: adminLpath = GetAdmin(lpathui [j]:o)
6: attSubj = GetSubAtt(adminLpath; lpathui [j]:s)
7: end if
8: if Match(attSubj; t:
00
s ) then
9: attObj = GetObjAtt(lpathui [j]:o; lpathui [j]:o)
10: end if
11: if Match(attObj; t:
00
o ) then
12: rt = CreateRT (adminLpath; req; 1)
13: end if
14: if MatchRT (t:
00
r t; rt; ui; 1) then
15: return lpathui node marked as not usable: newlpath
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: end procedure
Subsequently, access control policies  are evaluated. The evaluation of predi-
cates o, s and rt, conditions @c and the subset of obligations @b are analogous
to the corresponding elements of SoNeUCONABC [15]. Then, the evaluation
of  is what needs to be described herein (Function evaluate, Algorithm 2).
It is similar to evaluateTransPolicies, the only dierence is when all  2  are
evaluated over newlpath. If the result is `true' for all , the requested ri over
oi is granted whether results of evaluating the remaining elements in  are also
`true'.
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Algorithm 2 evaluate
1: procedure evaluate(r, newlpath, req )
2: for :[h] (h = 1) to sizeOf() do
3: for newlpathui  (i = 1) to sizeOf(newlpath) do
4: if :[h]:acti = newlpathui [j] then
5: if verifyDateT ime( [h]:dt; newlpathui [j]) then
6: adminLpath = GetAdmin(newlpathui [j]:o)
7: AttSubj = GetSubAtt(adminLpath; newlpathui [j]:s)
8: end if
9: if Match(attSubj;  [h]:00s ) then
10: AttObj = GetObjAtt(newlpathui [j]:o; newlpathui [j]:o)
11: end if
12: if Match(AttObj; :[h]:00o ) then
13: rt = CreateRT (adminLpath; req; 1)
14: end if
15: if MatchRT (:[h]:00r t; rt; ui; 1)) then
16: return  verified: Result true
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: end procedure
5 Evaluation
The evaluation of SoNeUCONABCPro comprises a goals analysis and a tem-
poral workload assessment.
5.1 Goals analysis
SoNeUCONABCPro addresses user provenance together with translucency. The
former feature is achieved by the inclusion of actions within obligations together
with management issues, namely the update of access control policies and the
enforcement procedure. Translucency is achieved by creating and managing poli-
cies by which users only disclose chosen actions.
Note that to apply SoNeUCONABCPro in a real WBSN the following three
guidelines should be considered: 1) WBSNs should allow the establishment of 
and t; 2) attributes within  such as age, role, etc. which are already used and
stored by WBSNs, should be involved in the access control process; and 3) user
actions have to be recorded by WBSNs and those actions included in t removed
from the access control enforcement process.
5.2 Temporal workload assessment
In SoNeUCONABCPro access control management is based on the evaluation
of policies  and translucency policies t per user request. A critical aspect is
10
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to keep the temporal workload under usability limits. In this regard, t will be
managed o-line whereas  are managed on-line. Each part will be analyzed
separately.
Experimental settings SoNeUCONABCPro is devoted to the very same goal
as its ancestor, SoNeUCONABC { access control. Therefore, experiments are
focused on measuring how much time it takes to assess the policies at stake in
dierent social network scenarios. The settings mainly relate to three aspects {
the social networks, the policies and the computational resources. Regarding the
rst aspect, the same four WBSNs created in the evaluation of SoNeUCONABC
have been considered herein. For illustration purposes, Table 2 depicts the num-
ber of nodes (#vi), relationships (#ei) and relationships per node (ei=vi) of
proposed WBSNs.
Table 2. WBSNs structure
WBSNs id #ei #vi ei=vi
1 2,980,388 50,000 60
2 5,965,777 50,000 120
3 8,949,375 50,000 185
4 10,929,713 50,000 219
As SoNeUCONABC policies did not consider user provenance or translu-
cency, they could not be directly applied to assess SoNeUCONABCPro. In
this case we consider that common actions that users perform in a WBSN
such as Facebook are Liked, Photos uploaded, Sent messages, Shared items
and Comments, where the percentage of actions usage is the one presented
in Table 3. However, apart from actions, the elements involved in policies
of SoNeUCONABC are similar to those involved in user provenance and
translucency { they aect subjects, objects and relationships. Thus, we as-
sume that these policies have similar computational requirements than user
provenance or translucency ones. For simplicity we keep the same policies than
SoNeUCONABC (see [15]).
Table 3. Percentage of actions usage in Facebook 3 4
Likes Photos uploaded Sent messages Shared items Comments
43.75 0.30 9.72 46.18 0.00071
The experiments were carried out on a Intel Core Due E8400 3.2GHz pro-
cessor with 4GB of RAM and Ubuntu 12.04. This experiment is designed to act
as a crude proof of principle as it is running on a modest system.
3 http://blog.wishpond.com/post/115675435109/40-up-to-date-facebook-facts-and-stats
, last access June 2017
4 https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics , last access June
2017
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O-line part: Translucency The evaluation of t consists of creating Pacui per
user ui and enforcing the verication of t over such path. Most WBSNs store
a timeline of our activities5. Then, Pacui can be created at runtime avoiding
the cost of its creation when policy enforcement is carried out. Likewise, the
separation of actions could benet performance to a great extent, for instance,
creating a path Pacj;ui for each type of action j. In the same way, the evaluation of
t over each Pacj;ui can be carried out o-line also beneting performance, that is
after the execution of a set of actions instead of per user's request. This simplies
the implementation of translucent user provenance in a real environment.
This workload is measured as follows. For each action in Pacui , it is necessary
to evaluate if conditions are met (thus hiding the action from access control eval-
uation) or not. As aforementioned, this evaluation involves the same elements as
those existing in SoNeUCONABC policies and then, in this previous model the
evaluation of proposed policies takes 13 ms at minimum and 184.5 ms on average
(see Appendix for details). Therefore, we take these values as the expected time
to assess each action.
Regarding the amount of actions (i.e. the length of Pacj;ui ), we propose dif-
ferent scenarios based on the amount of contacts and the number of actions
over each contact's data. Particularly, we consider 25, 50, 100, 300 contacts and
10, 25, 50, 75, 300, 450,750,1000,10000 actions per contact. Thus, Pacj;ui ranges
from 250 to 3000000 actions, though for performance reasons dierent paths per
type of action could be distinguished. Note that the amount of contacts is in line
with current gures, as 338 users is the average amount of Facebook friends6.
Considering established parameters, temporal workload of evaluating translu-
cency policies t is presented in Table 4. Depending on the type of action within
t, the temporal workload is highly aected because the higher the usage of ac-
tions (recall Table 3), the higher the nodes in Pacui to evaluate. Though results
are better when actions Photos uploaded or Comments are involved in t, as this
process is performed o-line, the impact of temporal workload is not a big issue.
For instance, when the action type is Comments, the evaluation takes 3 ms for
10 actions and around 0.39 ms for 1000 actions and 300 contacts in the average
case. However, when other actions are at stake, i.e. Shared items, the evaluation
takes 1.4 min for 10 actions and 42 min for 300 actions and 100 contacts in the
average case.
On-line part: Access control with user provenance The evaluation of 
that include user provenance is carried out on-line. As opposed to SoNeUCONABC
assessment, in this proposal obligations B are critical { recall that user prove-
nance can be seen as obligations involving actions,  2 .
Policy  enforcement can be divided into two main parts. First, the evaluation
of predicates regarding the object (o), the subject (s) and its relationships
5 https://es-la.facebook.com/notes/radio-949/timeline/309814275719798/ , last ac-
cess June 2017
6 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-facebook/ ,
last access June 2017
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Table 4. O-line part: translucency assessment. Temporal workload (sc)
# of actions per user's data
10 25 50 75 300 450 750 1000 100000
Like
Best time
# contacts per user
25 1.42 4.98 12.09 14.93 42.66 63.99 106.66 142.21 14220.92
50 2.84 9.95 24.17 29.86 85.32 127.98 213.31 284.41 28440.94
100 5.69 19.91 48.35 59.72 170.64 255.96 426.61 568.81 56881.08
300 17.06 59.72 145.04 179.17 511.92 767.89 1279.81 1706.41 170641.24
Average time
# contacts per user
25 20.13 60.38 140.88 181.14 603.79 905.69 1509.48 2012.64 201263.71
50 40.25 120.76 281.77 362.27 1207.58 1811.37 3018.95 4025.27 402526.75
100 80.51 241.52 563.54 724.55 2415.16 3622.74 6037.90 8050.53 805052.83
300 241.55 724.55 1690.61 2173.64 7246.47 10869.71 18116.18 24154.90 2415490.00
Photos uploaded
Best time
# contacts per user
25 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.33 0.50 0.83 1.11 110.61
50 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.23 0.66 1.00 1.66 2.21 221.21
100 0.04 0.15 0.38 0.46 1.33 1.99 3.32 4.42 442.41
300 0.13 0.46 1.13 1.39 3.98 5.97 9.95 13.27 1327.21
Average time
# contacts per user
25 0.16 0.47 1.10 1.41 4.70 7.04 11.74 15.65 1565.38
50 0.31 0.94 2.19 2.82 9.39 14.09 23.48 31.31 3130.76
100 0.63 1.88 4.38 5.64 18.78 28.18 46.96 62.62 6261.51
300 1.88 5.64 13.15 16.91 56.36 84.54 140.90 187.87 18787.10
Sent messages
Best time
# contacts per user
25 0.32 1.11 2.69 3.32 9.48 14.22 23.70 31.60 3160.20
50 0.63 2.21 5.37 6.64 18.96 28.44 47.40 63.20 6320.21
100 1.26 4.42 10.74 13.27 37.92 56.88 94.80 126.40 12640.24
300 3.79 13.27 32.23 39.82 113.76 170.64 284.40 379.20 37920.27
Average time
# contacts per user
25 4.47 13.42 31.31 40.25 134.18 201.26 335.44 447.25 44725.27
50 8.95 26.84 62.62 80.51 268.35 402.53 670.88 894.50 89450.39
100 17.89 53.67 125.23 161.01 536.70 805.05 1341.75 1789.01 178900.63
300 53.68 161.01 375.69 483.03 1610.33 2415.49 4025.82 5367.76 536775.56
Shared items
Best time
# contacts per user
25 1.50 5.25 12.76 15.76 45.03 67.55 112.58 150.11 15010.97
50 3.00 10.51 25.52 31.52 90.06 135.09 225.16 300.21 30020.99
100 6.00 21.01 51.03 63.04 180.12 270.19 450.31 600.41 60041.14
300 18.01 63.04 153.10 189.12 540.36 810.55 1350.91 1801.21 180121.31
Average time
# contacts per user
25 21.24 63.73 148.71 191.20 637.34 956.00 1593.34 2124.45 212445.03
50 42.49 127.47 297.42 382.40 1274.67 1912.00 3186.67 4248.89 424889.35
100 84.98 254.93 594.84 764.80 2549.33 3824.00 6373.33 8497.78 849777.98
300 254.97 764.80 1784.53 2294.40 7649.05 11473.58 19122.63 25496.84 2549683.89
Comments
Best time
# contacts per user
25 210 5 810 5 210 4 210 4 710 4 110 3 110 3 210 3 0.23
50 510 5 110 4 310 4 410 4 110 3 210 3 310 3 410 3 0.46
100 910 5 310 4 710 4 910 4 210 3 410 3 610 3 910 3 9.29
300 210 4 910 4 210 3 210 3 810 3 0.01 0.02 0.02 2.78
Average time
# contacts per user
25 310 4 910 4 210 3 210 3 910 4 0.01 0.02 0.03 3.28
50 610 4 110 3 410 3 510 3 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 6.56
100 110 3 310 3 910 3 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.13 13.13
300 310 3 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.29 0.39 39.42
(rt). For this part the temporal workload is exactly the time of SoNeUCONABC
policies. Second, the evaluation of the obligations B that the requester needs to
fulll. In this second part, we consider policies with a single user provenance
obligation . Given that this obligation involves the same elements that the rst
part (i.e. subjects, objects and relationships), we assume that it takes the same
time { 13 ms (best case) and 184.5 ms (on average) { per element in the path.
Table 5 shows the time taken for the evaluation of . The time needed is
practically the same as the one required for translucency. The rationale behind
this is that in user provenance we need to add the time for assessing the related
predicates o, s and rt which turns out to be small as compared to the time
to evaluate obligations .
Despite of the similarity, the acceptance criterion for these times involves
usability aspects because this is an on-line evaluation. Results are suitable if
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they do not negatively aect to the user experience. Establishing 15 sc as the
maximum threshold for keeping users attention7 [22], values in bold on Table
5 are suitable. Only when types of actions Photos uploaded and Comments are
involved within B the temporal workload remains within the established limit,
as well as a signicant amount of actions can be considered, i.e. 10000 actions for
Comments in the average case. Nevertheless, for the remaining types of actions
these results are subject to improvement, as discussed below.
Table 5. On-line part: user provenance assessment. Temporal workload (sc)
# of actions per user's data
10 25 50 75 300 450 750 1000 100000
Like
Best time
# contacts per user
25 1.43 4.98 12.09 14.95 42.83 64.25 107.08 142.78 14277.80
50 2.85 9.96 24.18 29.88 85.49 128.24 213.73 284.98 28497.82
100 5.69 19.91 48.35 59.74 170.81 256.22 427.03 569.38 56937.96
300 17.07 59.73 145.05 179.18 512.09 768.14 1280.24 1706.98 170698.12
Average time
# contacts per user
25 20.21 60.46 140.96 181.38 606.21 909.32 1515.53 2020.71 202070.95
50 40.33 120.84 281.85 362.52 1210.00 1815.00 3025.00 4033.34 403333.99
100 80.59 241.60 563.62 724.79 2417.58 3626.37 6043.95 8058.60 805860.06
300 241.63 724.63 1690.69 2173.88 7248.89 10873.34 18122.23 24162.97 2416297.23
Photos uploaded
Best time
# contacts per user
25 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.33 0.50 0.83 1.11 111.05
50 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.23 0.66 1.00 1.66 2.22 221.65
100 0.04 0.15 0.38 0.46 1.33 1.99 3.32 4.43 442.85
300 0.13 0.46 1.13 1.39 3.98 5.97 9.96 13.28 1327.65
Average time
# contacts per user
25 0.16 0.47 1.10 1.41 4.71 7.07 11.79 15.72 1571.66
50 0.31 0.94 2.19 2.82 9.41 14.12 23.53 31.37 3137.03
100 0.63 1.88 4.38 5.64 18.80 28.21 47.01 62.68 6267.79
300 1.88 5.64 13.15 16.91 56.38 84.57 140.95 187.93 18793.38
Sent messages
Best time
# contacts per user
25 0.32 1.11 2.69 3.32 9.52 14.28 23.80 31.73 3172.84
50 0.63 2.21 5.37 6.64 19.00 28.50 47.50 63.33 6332.85
100 1.27 4.43 10.75 13.28 37.96 56.94 94.90 126.53 12652.88
300 3.79 13.27 32.23 39.82 113.80 170.70 284.50 379.33 37932.91
Average time
# contacts per user
25 4.49 13.44 31.33 40.31 134.71 202.07 336.78 449.05 44904.66
50 8.96 26.85 62.63 80.56 268.89 403.33 672.22 896.30 89629.77
100 17.91 53.69 125.25 161.06 537.24 805.86 1343.10 1790.80 179080.01
300 53.70 161.03 375.71 483.08 1610.86 2416.30 4027.16 5369.55 536954.94
Shared items
Best time
# contacts per user
25 1.51 5.26 12.76 15.78 45.21 67.82 113.03 150.71 15071.01
50 3.01 10.51 25.52 31.54 90.24 135.36 225.61 300.81 30081.03
100 6.01 21.02 51.04 63.06 180.30 270.46 450.76 601.01 60101.18
300 18.02 63.05 153.10 189.14 540.54 810.82 1351.36 1801.81 180181.34
Average time
# contacts per user
25 21.33 63.82 148.80 191.46 639.89 959.84 1599.73 2132.97 213297.11
50 42.57 127.55 297.51 382.66 1277.22 1915.84 3193.06 4257.41 425741.43
100 85.06 255.02 594.93 765.05 2551.89 3827.84 6379.73 8506.30 850630.07
300 255.05 764.88 1784.61 2294.65 7651.61 11477.41 19129.02 25505.36 2550535.97
Comments
Best time
# contacts per user
25 210 5 810 5 210 4 210 4 710 4 110 3 110 3 210 3 0.23
50 510 5 110 4 310 4 410 4 110 3 210 3 310 3 410 3 0.46
100 910 5 310 4 710 4 910 4 210 3 410 3 610 3 910 3 9.29
300 210 4 910 4 210 3 210 3 810 3 0.01 0.02 0.02 2.78
Average time
# contacts per user
25 310 4 910 4 210 3 210 3 910 4 0.01 0.02 0.03 3.29
50 610 4 110 3 410 3 510 3 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 6.58
100 110 3 310 3 910 3 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.13 13.15
300 310 3 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.29 0.39 39.43
Discussion Results achieved in the experiments lead to dierent considerations:
7 Although 2 sc would be a desirable threshold [22], we believe that the proposed limit
is illustrative enough as it is the maximum acceptable upper limit.
14
SoNeUCONABCPro
{ Regarding translucency, it can be performed o-line (thus not aecting us-
ability) and with immensely greater computational resources.
{ The proposed study presents the worst-case analysis. The evaluation of predi-
cates 0o, 
0
s and 
0
rt within each obligation  are evaluated for every acj ui:ok 2
Pacj;ui . Conversely, in a real scenario not all policies  include subjects, objects
and relationships predicates, thus reducing the measured temporal workload.
Additionally, the algorithm applied in the evaluation can be enhanced (recall
Alg. 15), e.g. a divide and conquer algorithm to search in ordered lists may
be used.
{ Computational resources currently applied by WBSNs are much more powerful
than those applied herein, e.g. parallelism could alleviate the problem.
In sum, this worst-case analysis has shown that even with constrained com-
putational resources and with heavyweight policies, the proposed approach is
feasible.
6 Related work
Lots of WBSN models have been developed. Many of them are based on assorted
features, i.e. roles [18], trust [5], relationships [13], attributes [21] and ontology
[20]. Besides, dealing with attributes management but looking for expressiveness
SoNeUCONABC was proposed [15].
Other proposals manage data provenance in WBSNs. The origin and traces
of data is involved in the access control management process. A data prove-
nance based access control model is proposed by Park et al. [23][24]. It provides
dynamic separation of duties, origin-based control and objects versioning in en-
vironments like WBSNs. Pei et al. [25] dene a framework to capture data prove-
nance and create access control policies from collected data being possible its
application in WBSNs. Cheng et al. [9] look for the administrative management
of a relationship-based access control model including provenance management.
A step forward can be taken by managing user provenance access control.
Considering this feature as a trustworthiness analysis focused on tracing WBSN
users' actions, some works can be pointed out. A monitoring system to cap-
ture and analyse WBSN users behaviour is proposed in [17]. Sybildefender [32],
SybilInfer [11] and Sybilguard [33] focus on identifying sybil WBSN nodes. In
addition, [26] works with policies that involve users' actions but they are applied
for dynamic access control instead of provenance management.
The negative side of provenance management is the privacy problems it in-
volves [12] as the identication of data or user traces may reveal private data.
Multiple proposals work on the establishment of anonymous interactions [31][35].
Others focus on protecting users' data [16][10][2] or users' relationships [34][6]
by applying cryptography. Several works in the context of social translucency
have been proposed [14]. The idea is the management of which relationships are
established and to whom by being aware of the situation and accountable at the
same time.
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Despite existing WBSN access control models, user provenance has not al-
ready been addressed by any of them. In the same way, those which have worked
with user provenance in the form of capturing users' behaviours, do not consider
privacy at all, in contrast to the concept of translucency proposed in this model.
7 Conclusion
The massive expansion of WBSNs together with the amount of security issues
they involve, foster their research and innovation. The origin and trace of actions
performed by a WBSN user, called user provenance, together with translucency
to avoid privacy problems are requirements to include within WBSN access con-
trol models. SoNeUCONABCPro extends a previous version, SoNeUCONABC
an expressive access control model for WBSNs, including the management of
user provenance together with translucency. From the authors knowledge this is
the rst time both concepts are applied for access control management purposes.
Its implementation has been empirically studied and it is feasible in dierent sce-
narios. While translucency management could be performed without restrictions,
some settings are acceptable for user provenance management.
Future work will focus on facilitating selective translucency. Users have to be
able to choose to whom translucency policies are applied instead of hiding per-
formed actions for everyone. Also the improvement of performance is an issue to
consider, as well as usability issues regarding the specication and management
of policies by WBSN users.
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Appendix: Temporal workload enforcement in
SoNeUCONABC
Coloured in gray in Table 6, the evaluation of proposed policies in SoNeUCONABC
takes 13 ms at minimum and 184.5 ms on average.
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Table 6. Policy enforcement temporal workload in SoNeUCONABC
WBSN id = 1
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms)
1 4143 4144 4143 4143 4142 4142
2 435 435 435 435 435 435
3 28 28 28 28 28 28
4 54 55 54 54 54 54
5 38 38 38 38 38 38
6 51 51 51 51 51 51
7 13 13 13 13 13 13
WBSN id = 2
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms)
9 21291 21304 21291 2289 21289 21287
9 712 712 712 713 712 712
10 58 57 57 57 58 57
11 88 88 89 89 88 88
12 61 60 60 60 61 60
13 62 62 63 62 62 62
14 31 30 30 30 30 30
WBSN id = 3
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms)
15 56825 56816 56815 56813 56820 56811
16 274 273 274 273 273 273
17 80 80 80 81 80 80
18 110 111 110 110 110 110
19 89 88 89 88 88 88
20 86 86 86 86 87 86
21 36 37 36 37 36 36
WBSN id = 4
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms) P7-TW (ms)
22 105549 105545 105554 105558 105496 105563
23 1721 1722 1721 1721 1721 1722
24 44 45 44 44 44 45
25 135 134 134 134 134 135
26 96 97 96 96 96 97
27 83 83 83 83 83 84
28 46 46 46 46 46 47
Average 184.6 184.5 184.5 184.5 184.5 184.6
Total 184.5
average
*Results of evaluating proposed policies (see [15]) in created WBSNs over 28 pairs of random users are presented in
this Table. Considering 2000 ms a usability limit for being approximately the tolerable waiting time of WBSN users for
information retrieval [22], removing cases that exceed this threshold (details in [15]).
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